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The vast areas of applications for IoTs in future smart cities, industrial automation, smart transportation systems, and smart health
facilities represent a thriving surface for several security attacks with enormous economic, environmental and societal impacts. This
survey paper presents a review of several security challenges of emerging IoT networks and discusses some of the attacks and their
countermeasures based on different domains in IoT networks. Most conventional security solutions for IoT networks are adopted from
communication networks while noting the particular characteristics of IoT networks such as the huge number of nodes, heterogeneity
of the network, and the limited energy, communication, and computation of the nodes, these conventional security methods are not
really adequate. One important challenge toward utilizing common secret key-based cryptographic methods in very large scale IoT
networks is the problem of secret key generation, distribution, and storage in IoT devices and more importantly protecting these secret
keys from physical attacks. Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are recently utilized as a promising hardware security solution for
identification and authentication in IoT networks. Since PUFs extract the unique hardware characteristics, they potentially offer an
affordable and practical solution for secret key generation. However, several barriers limit the applications of different types of PUFs
for key generation purposes. We discuss the advantages of PUF-based key generation methods, review the state-of-the-art techniques
in this field and propose a reliable PUF-based solution for secret key generation using resistive random-access memories (RERAMs)
embedded in IoTs1.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication technologies have managed to imprint itself into everyone’s lives through emerging Internet
of Things (IoTs). IoT allows interconnection of billions of objects from tiny sensors to automobiles, and smart phones to
factories and hospitals. IoT systems currently impact different aspects of people daily life. Various kinds of information
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including location information, medical information, and etc are constantly gathered by sensors and different electronic
and tracking devices [17]. Some examples include using smart watches to set the credit cards with the cell phone’s
NFC interface to stimulate a transaction protocol and reduce the required time for shopping [54]; using IoT-based
remote health monitoring systems to gather information from patients in a short time and inform the physicians
to take timely actions [99]. Figure 1 demonstrates various applications of IoT systems in our day-to-day life. While
IoT networks have improved the quality of life in many levels and opened up a path for several new services, due
to the power and computing limitation, high mobility, and the dynamic nature of the network, security threats and
attacks can rapidly propagate throughout the entire network [83]. One key challenge in IoT networks is the lack of
a unified security, identification and authentication standard, while new products and technologies come to market
every day without paying enough attention to the potential security threats. Besides the security challenges, there are
several other concerns regarding the large scale IoT networks in terms of data fusion and data management, complexity,
spectrum scarcity, and so on [3, 51, 53, 145–147, 150, 169, 170, 189]. Moreover, several recent IoT technologies are still
based on IPV4 for addressing which compromises the scalability of these networks.
Fig. 1. Some examples of IoT applications
The attacks on IoTs are usually intentional attacks by hackers who silently eavesdrop the communications between
the nodes and gather confidential information or intrude themselves in the network and tamper with the sensitive
information that can potentially result in failure of the entire system. According to Symantec [123], cyber-criminals
progressively target IoT devices since they are developing and expanding rapidly. The number of IoT attacks increased
by 600% in 2017 compared to 2016 [123]. In 2018, there was an increase of 217.5% from 2017 with 32.7 million IoT attacks.
Ransomware is one of the growing malwares, in which the attacker uses Bitcoin or prepaid credit cards to demand
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money, where they do not need to decrypt the public or private keys for stealing cards information [117, 172]. For
instance, in the earlier months of 2017, a number of individuals and businesses around the world were affected by two
huge ransomware attacks, followed by a variant called "Wanacry" which affected 300,000 computers. Petya is another
version of the Ransomware attack, which exploited the existence of a third party software to spread and grow itself
in the networks [67, 139, 181]. The prevalence of this malware started from Ukraine, where 12,500 computers were
affected. According to Microsoft, this malware has been outspread by using a third-party application [67]. Dyn cyber
attack in 2016 that caused distributed denial of service (DDoS) for several Internet platforms and services in Europe
and North America was also a result of insufficient security at the IoT nodes [47]. These attacks have even penetrated
into remote health monitoring systems. An article published in the Journal of the American College of Cardiology in
February 2018, confirms that cardiac devices can be attacked by hackers leading to severe consequences or even death
in some cases [8].
There are several factors contributing to the immense security vulnerability of IoTs including the limited energy
available at IoT nodes, their low computational capability, the huge number of available nodes in the network as well as
the heterogeneous nature of the network [137]. These characteristics, in particular, the number of connected devices,
often result in inefficient performance of conventional security mechanisms. By 2020, it is expected that about 31 billion
IoT devices will be connected to the Internet, which drastically increases the need for advanced security mechanisms
for IoT. These devices need to communicate with each other to transmit the data they collected or received from other
devices and intelligently respond and react to the received information. Therefore, it is crucial that information is
received from and sent to an authenticated user. Figure 2a shows a few examples of IoT devices connected to the
Internet, which can be controlled using the users’ cellphones or smart watches. If these devices are hacked, it can
interrupt the users’ daily life. For example, the user may not be able to use his/her car or even the hacker can induce
a heart attack for the users with implanted pacemakers. Figure 2b shows an example of an attack on an IoT device
that allows remote control over a smart home, a car navigation system and a remote heart monitoring system for a
patient with a pacemaker. The goal of the attacker is to interrupt the communications between different IoT nodes and
to manipulate the data being sent, by extracting the cryptographic key. In such scenarios, tamper detection circuits are
needed to prevent the attacks, but these are infeasible in low-power IoT nodes.
The security challenges in IoTs can be broadly classified into identification, authentication, encryption, confidentially,
jamming, cloning, hijacking, and privacy. Encryption has been widely used by several mechanisms in order to send
their messages without the risk of being understood by the hackers. Encrypting messages does not allow the hackers to
have access to the messages and eliminates the risk of data manipulation. Hence, cryptographic methods play a crucial
role in the security of IoT systems. Well-known cryptographic mechanisms include Public Key Infrastructure (PKI),
Advanced Encryption Etandard (AES), Data Encryption Standard (DES), and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) rely on
cryptographic keys [46, 143]. In PKI-based systems, there are two sets of keys for each user, private and public keys.
The private keys need to be kept secret while the public keys can be known by everyone. If one key is used to encrypt a
message, the other key needs to be used in order to decrypt the message. These secret (private) cryptographic keys are
expected to be robust, reliable and reproducible and they are usually stored in the Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) of the
devices. However, the NVMs are highly susceptible to physical attacks.
The cryptographic keys are sensitive information and therefore, several mechanisms have been developed to protect
these keys. White Box Cryptography (WBC) is a software based solution to protect these keys and allow secure
distribution of valuable information [76]. WBC requires high processing power and memory and is only applicable to
symmetric cryptographic methods; therefore, it will not be a competing candidate for the security of IoT networks. In
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(a) An example of an IoT system with access to a smart home, a
car and a remote health monitoring. (b) IoT environment attacked by a hacker.
Fig. 2. IoT environment with and without existence of an attacker
Table 1. Differences between hardware- and software-based security
Hardware-based security Software-based security
Circuitry Requires dedicated hardware and processor Does not require new hardware
Cost Expensive Inexpensive
Power Requires extra power for hardware No extra power is required
Updates Hard to update in order to accommodate new security threats Easy to update to accommodate new security threats
Load on host Processor No extra load Extra load which might compromise efficiency
Key Protection Protected by crypto-hardware No protection for keys
Vulnerability Difficult to extract the key Easy to decode the algorithm and extract the key
addition, RSA encryption keys are stored on a specialized chip called trusted platform modules, introduced in [82], on
an endpoint device (client device) to allow secured encryption. Physical computing devices called Hardware Security
Modules (HSM) were designed to safeguard and manage digital keys. HSM requires programming equipment and
interfaces to allow fast data transfer. Since the number of IoT devices is increasing rapidly, key management including
key generation, key distribution and key storage in large-scale IoT networks is a major challenge in security of IoTs.
In general, there are two types of software-based, and hardware-based mechanisms to protect IoT devices from
various attacks. Software-based security mechanisms rely solely on software to protect their messages. As they are
based on algorithms, it may be easier to decode the algorithm to extract the secret keys. Therefore, these security
mechanisms are vulnerable to many attacks such as malware, phishing, DoS, etc. In software-based security mechanisms,
the keys are stored in the NVM of the devices which are prone to attacks. Though software-based security systems
were effective all these years, the advancement in hardware and computers may allow the hackers to break the systems
such as using quantum computers. Hardware-based security uses a dedicated hardware integrated circuit or processor
to perform cryptographic functions and store the keys. They can prevent read-and-write access to data and offer a
stronger protection against various attacks. However, hardware-based security is prone to man-in-the-middle attacks.
The hardware-based mechanisms such as HSM have been used for crypto processing and strong authentication where
it can encrypt, decrypt, store, and manage digital keys. HSM has been used alongside software mechanisms such as PKI,
AES to encrypt their messages [14].
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Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are a hardware-based security primitive introduced in 2002 [56]. The PUF
utilizes the intrinsic manufacturing variations in a device to generate a fingerprint of the hardware that offers the
valuable advantage of unclonability. This means that the device cannot be cloned even when a hacker has physical
access to the device. Therefore, the PUFs are unique to their device and can be used as a security primitive to enable
device-based identification, authentication, and secret key generation.
PUFs can provide a low cost alternative solution for on-demand generation of cryptographic keys from the device
rather than the conventional methods, where the secret keys are produced and distributed by the server and stored in
the IoT device memories [37].
The data derived from PUFs is often highly sensitive to environmental changes and the physical conditions where
the device is being tested. In other words, the readings from the PUFs are not perfectly reproducible. Therefore, different
types of PUFs have been used for the purpose of identification and authentication of devices, where a certain margin
of error rate is tolerable. However, even a small amount of variation in the PUF’s responses in different conditions
can prevent them from being utilized in key generation because the key used for encryption needs to be perfectly
reproducible to decrypt the messages.
1.1 Review of Recent Relevant Survey Papers and the Contributions of this Paper
This survey aims to focus on the applicability of PUFs-based hardware security for key generation and authentication
of IoT devices. The paper offers a unique and timely survey compared to existing survey papers in the literature
by investigating the role of PUFs in IoT security, in particular providing an additional level of security to common
key-based cryptographic methods to generate the keys from the devices. In 2018, authors of [28] discuss the standards
of wireless communication in Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) and IoT and focus on security of these systems. The paper
does not study the physical side channel attacks in implementation of security mechanisms for these systems. The paper
explains in detail, the various wireless communication standards and protocols. Later, it briefly reviews the security
threats in IoT and CPS domains and concludes the paper with recommendations on careful selection of devices from
sensors to routers, and auditing the systems using dedicated third party surveillance technologies. The paper does not
address the problems in identifying malicious nodes and authenticating known users in the network. In [178], several
recent challenges are identified as a result of the introduction of IoT and CPS systems are discussed. This work focuses
on different attacks and threats for these systems as well as challenges related to implementation of CPS and IoT in the
wireless network.
In [97], the security and privacy challenges of IoT in general and possible attacks in different layers of IoT devices
were discussed. In particular, this paper discusses the security challenges of fog/edge computing-based IoT. In [11],
the use of information-centric networking (ICN) as a possible protocol for addressing IoT devices was introduced.
This paper stresses on the need for larger and permanent naming scheme and addressing space for IoT contents and
devices. ICN-based solutions for IoTs were discussed along with classification of ICN-IoT architecture into naming,
caching, security and mobility fields for applicability of ICN for IoTs. The authors also provided a detailed survey on ICN
based caching, naming, security, and mobility approaches for IoTs. In [59], the authors identify different protocols and
mechanisms to secure communications in IoT and the security weaknesses of IoT at different layers of communication.
In [40], the authors discussed the use of programmable hardware such as FPGAs in network infrastructure security.
This paper highlighted the role of hardware-based mechanisms to address some of the challenges in software-based
methods, as well as the potential challenges due to the rising demands of intensive analysis and real time operation for
sequential processing.
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Table 2. Abbreviation Table
Abbreviation Paraphrase Abbreviation Paraphrase
AES Advanced Encryption Systems CPS Cyber Physical Systems
CRP Challenge Response Pair DoS Denial of Service
DDoS Distributed DoS DES Data Encryption System
DHT Distributed Hash Tag ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
HSM Hardware Security Modules IC Integrated Circuit
ICN Information Centric Network IoT Internet of Things
IP Intellectual Property LDPC Low Density parity Check
MRAM Magnetoresistive Random Access Memory MQTT Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
NVM Non-Volatile Memory OSI Open System Interconnection
OSN Online Social Network PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PUF Physically Unclonable Function RE-RAM REsistve Random Access Memory
RF Radio Frequency RFID Radio Frequency Identification
RSA Rivest Shamir Aldeman SDA Software Defined Network
SEA Secure and Efficient Architecture SEM Scanning Electron Microscope
SMB Server Message Block SoC System on Chip
SOA Secure-Oriented Architecture SS Secure Sketch
SSL Secure Socket Layer TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TSL Transport Layer Security ULP Ultra Low Power
UUID Universally Unique IDentifier WBC White Box Cryptography
The key contribution of this survey compared to the previously published surveys in the area of IoT security
is studying the role of memory-based PUFs in authentication and identification of the various IoT devices. More
importantly, we discuss the potential advantages and challenges of using PUF-based secret key generation mechanisms
to add another level of security to popular key-based cryptographic methods. Such mechanisms, if successful can
enhance the security of a huge number of IoT devices against physical attacks. To the best of our knowledge, the current
memory-based PUF techniques do not have the required robustness and reliability to generate fully reproducible secret
keys as required in cryptographic systems. This need calls for new PUF generation technologies and robust mechanisms
for key generation as discussed in this paper.
This survey paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, various security challenges in different domains of IoT
networks are presented, with a focus on the applications, architecture, communications, and data domains. In Sections
2.2 and 2.3, different attacks in an IoT network are briefly described. Section 3 explains the chain of integrated circuit
manufacturing and points out hardware attacks based on the vulnerable points. Section 5 reviews the PUFs which
are based on static random access memories. In Section 4, the concept of PUF, their classification along with their
application in different security applications are discussed. In Section 6, ReRAM-based PUFs are explained in details
and the challenges in using them for key generation is discussed. In Section 7, the use of fuzzy extractors to generate
keys from noisy data is described. In 8, we provide a survey on the state-of-the-art key generation mechanisms. In
Section 9, the concluding remarks and future directions of research are discussed.
1.2 Abbreviation Table
All of the abbreviations used throughout this paper are summarized in Table 2.
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Fig. 3. Domains and security concepts in IoT
2 SECURITY CHALLENGES AND ATTACKS IN IOTS
2.1 Security Taxonomy
In this paper, we focus on the security challenges of IoTs and the potential impact of PUF technology to address
some of these challenges. In IoT networks, a large number of sensors and devices are connected to the Internet which
forms a huge network with mobility and heterogeneity characteristics that entangles protecting the network from
security attacks. Moreover, the limited energy and computation capability of IoT nodes restrict the utilization of some
conventional security mechanisms in these networks [5, 108]. One key challenge related to utilizing some traditional
security protocols is the heterogeneous nature of IoT networks due to the wide variety of applications of these networks.
As a result, different applications require different protection mechanisms. In most scenarios, these applications can
be categorized by different characteristics such as user association, openness, and heterogeneity. The heterogeneity
of IoTs can degrade the efficiency of cryptographic methods that rely on the key generation and key exchange [190].
Furthermore, noting the characteristics of IoT networks, the security attacks such as DoS, routing attack, replay attack,
man-in-the-middle, side channel attack, node capture, and mass node authentication are common threats in these
networks.
Figure 3 shows the various security concepts for IoT based on four domains namely, application, architecture,
communication, and data. Based on these stack layers, a security taxonomy can be defined in IoT. Next, different
concepts of security for each of the application, data, communication, and architecture domains are introduced. Then,
different sub-domains as authentication, authorization, trust establishment, and exhaustion of resource are explained
for the application.
2.1.1 Data. One of the important aspects of security in IoT networks is data privacy and confidentiality which remain
critical concerns [25]. In general, confidentiality is a security concept which ensures that unauthorized users cannot
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access the data or even try to hijack the information. One of the challenges in IoT networks is dealing with a large
number of diverse users and applications, hence it is hard to keep confidentiality. Secure key management is one of
the methods which can improve the confidentiality in IoT networks [34, 97]. On the other hand, privacy makes sure
that data and information are only accessible by authorized users and cannot be changed by others. Most of the time,
the main focus of confidentiality is on the encryption of the data; however, privacy defines the level of access on the
received data for different users [97, 188]. Finally, trust is a concept for the user to accept the security, privacy, and
confidentiality in each network. Trust imposes privacy, confidentiality, and security among different layers of IoT, or
between different devices and applications [9, 50, 97].
2.1.2 Communication. Communication in IoT network is defined based on exchanging or sharing of information
and data between the users, devices or even exchanging information between different IoT layers. Noting the wide
applications of IoT devices in different domains, several communication protocols have been used in IoT networks
leading these networks being vulnerable to various communication attacks [66]. As a result, the communication medium
is a bottleneck for many attacks such as Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)[64] and eavesdropping attacks[121].
2.1.3 Architecture. There is no global and specific architectures for IoT networks to validate the security concepts for
authorization and authentication. However, various architectures such as Software-Defined Network (SDN) [168], secure
and efficient architecture (SEA) [109], smart city [57], service-oriented architecture (SOA), object security architecture
(OSCAR) [174], and black SDN [35] are proposed to examine both authentication and authorization.
2.1.4 Application. Scope, scale, heterogeneous, accessible, and repeatable are the application features that can be used
to evaluate different security techniques such as authentication, authorization, exhaustion, and trust establishment [62].
Since there is no definite architecture for IoT devices, various techniques have been developed for authentication and
authorization in this domain [39]. Noting the wide range of applications of IoT, attacks on these systems can impact
several critical domains. Next, different IoT security challenges based on the application domains are introduced.
I) Authentication: The authentication refers to the process of verifying the identity of devices to grant them with
information access. Data integrity and unauthorized access to the IoT networks such as impersonating attacks are
critical issues in these systems. The objective of the authentication process is to assure that the nodes only carry
validated information from the legitimated sources. In order to manage numerous IoT networks offered by different
vendors, the IoT devices need to be authenticated to validate their identities before routing any information. The
authentication mechanisms usually rely on a certification authority (CA) that involves a fairly heavy load of message
exchange between the CA and the low power IoT nodes. The authors of [62] proposed an authentication scheme based
on hashing and element extraction used for application layer in IoT nodes. An access control method is implemented in
[116] that adopts an ECC-based key establishment. For access control policy, the authors utilized a role-based access
control (RBAC) authentication method employing the nodes’ particular role(s) and applications in the corresponding
IoT network. One drawback of this work is that it incurs a large number of overhead messages during the access control
and authentication mechanisms. In [182], a new authentication method is developed which considers the IoT perception
layer. This method enhances mutual authentication between the user and the sensor nodes, and intermediate processes.
II) Authorization: Authorization is defined as how IoT nodes (e.g., sensors or actuators) can access the resource of
information. Let us consider an example of IoT application in health care. In this case, the sensitive information such as
the critical health profile of the patients are momentous and only authorized nodes or users should be able to access this
data. Therefore, the IoT devices should not be able to reveal the data to other unauthorized users or nearby users [1].
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III) Exhaustion of resources: The rate of energy consumption of IoT devices varies based on the applications [23].
Resource-exhaustion attacks are another common threat in IoT networks that causes a high rate of resource consumption,
and, in particular, energy consumption. For instance, the routing protocols in IoT networks are susceptible to exhaustion
attacks, because the existence of loops in routing mechanisms can drain the energy of nodes. In these attacks, the
attacker utilizes DoS to target in-range nodes. Since, each receiver responds to the attacker, the depletion rate of resource
in each battery increases [26].
IV) Trust establishment: Trust can be defined in three different concepts for IoT networks. i) Trust for security at
each separate layer: reliability, confidentiality, and integrity of data should be protected with security and privacy
concepts in each layer; ii) Trust between layers: different layers in the IoT networks should protect the privacy and trust
during communications; iii) Establishing the trust between the end user and the IoT network: since data is transmitted
between the end user and the IoT system, a trust concept should be provided for both ends. In addition, actions of both
ends affect the operation for the other side. Therefore, it is crucial to define a robust trust mechanism between the user
and the IoT system.
In summary, in the aforementioned key-based security mechanisms, each node in IoT networks needs to locally
store the digital secret key for authentication or encryption purposes. Traditionally, most digital keys are stored in
non-volatile memories such as ROM or one-time electronic fuse. Nevertheless, using a scanning electron microscope
(SEM), attackers can implement many invading threats on these chips. However, using these kinds of memories requires
additional fabrication steps during the production of the device. Antifuse or electronic fuse is another security technique
which is being used for key storage using FinFET transistors [43]. The main benefit of this technology is that the
information is not disclosed from the power consumption during the reading process. Moreover, this technology
enhances the reliability of the read procedure. The only disadvantage is that it fails to remove the key from the device.
Once the key is exposed, it cannot be eliminated from the chip.
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a principle that is being used for authentication and authorization which
does not need any non-volatile memory [56, 132]. They can be also used for cryptographic key generation, where the
digital keys are not stored in the device, rather, they are extracted from the physical features of the device. PUFs exploit
the random disorder of the physical system in the environment or from the manufacturer. These disorders cannot be
re-fabricated again. Hence, they are called intrinsic behavior of the device. Although these features are disadvantageous
from the perspective of integrated circuits, they can be advantageous from a security perspective. In recent years, PUFs
face many critical challenges such as reproducibility, wireless transmission of data, and exposure to the predictive
models for attacks.
In general, cryptographic methods are currently the most reliable way to secure IoT devices in a vulnerable en-
vironment. However, power utilization and key storage are amongst the main concerns when implementing these
cryptographic methods in IoT networks. Next, we discuss the contributions of PUF technology to IoT security and in
particular key generation for cryptographic methods.
2.2 Attacks
The specific characteristics of IoT devices such as low price, low power, and low computational capability as well as
the heterogeneity and large-scale of the network limit the applications of common security mechanisms. Therefore,
IoTs are prone to several advanced attacks and security issues [94, 115, 165] that calls for novel security mechanisms
in different domains, including identification/authentication, reliability, confidentiality, and non-renunciation. In this
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section, we review some common attacks on IoTs such as spoofing, altering, replay routing attack, DoS, node capture
attack, and Sybil attack.
2.2.1 Denial of Service Attack (DoS). In this attack, the attacker tries to exploit all the resources in the network which
can seriously degrade the network performance. The DoS attack is also called a computational resource attack. These
attacks are categorized into two groups: individual (single) DoS and Distributed DoS (DDoS) [7, 16]. In a single DoS
attack, the intruder as a single entity tries to exhaust the resources of the target entity. However, in a DDoS attack,
multiple attackers exploit the single entity or a single attacker compromises multiple users to flood the target machine
with lots of requests.
2.2.2 Sybil attack. Networks with a large number of users are more prone to Sybil attacks. In this attack, a single
node is identified with different IDs. This means that the unification of entities will be eliminated from the network
[160]. Based on [187], in 2012, 76 million users on Facebook and 20 million users on Twitter were fake. Online Social
Networks (OSNs) such as Facebook, Instagram, or Tweeter are prone to this kind of attack as they have lots of users.
One of the purposes of the Sybil attack is to hijack the information from the OSNs and websites. Since the number
of IoT devices is growing rapidly, they are also vulnerable to Sybil attacks. A Sybil attack can cause users to produce
fake and false reports. Users might also receive spam messages from fake profiles and fail to keep their privacy. Sybil
attacks can be categorized into three different types: SA-1, SA-2, and SA-3 [187]. Different mechanisms including Friend
Relationship-based Sybil Detection (FRSD), cryptography-based mobile sybil detection, and feature-based mobile sybil
detection are being used to defend IoT networks against Sybil attacks [187].
2.2.3 Spoofed, Alter, or Replay Routing Information. In these types of attacks, an attacker changes the routing informa-
tion or tried to manipulate the routing packets by listening to the legitimate transmitter and impersonate the identity
of the real transmitter. Then, it sends fake data to the receiver and introduce loops into the network [160, 184].
2.2.4 Attacks based on Access-Level. Based on the level of access to the network, these types of attacks are categorized
into two groups namely, passive and active attacks.
Passive Attacks: In most passive attacks, the attacker just eavesdrops the communication between the legitimate
transmitter and its receiver to exploit their data. [6, 16, 72].
Active Attacks: In active attacks, the intruder attempts to disturb the connection between the legitimate entities,
perform impersonation itself, or even disrupt the connection by manipulating the routing information [16, 72, 107, 135].
2.2.5 Attacks in Communication Protocols. The communication functions of IoT networks are commonly described by
the TCP/IP model. Table 3 presents the taxonomy of attacks that are possible on the TCP/IP protocol stack.
Figure 4 demonstrates a schematic representation of IoT attacks, some of which have been described in previous
subsections. A detailed description of all of these attacks is beyond the scope of this paper. The glowed-arrows
and dashed-circles show the concentration path for PUF application in IoT which is the main focus of this paper
[15, 29, 55, 72, 111, 119, 124, 141, 148, 179, 187].
2.2.6 Attacks based on device property. IoT devices are categorized into two groups: low-end and high-end device class.
Based on these types, attacks might have different effects on the devices. They might just result in abnormal behavior
or they might stop the devices from working [72].
High-end device class attacks: In this class of attacks, powerful devices such as laptops and computers are used to
launch attacks on the IoT network. Most of the time, the Internet protocol is used between the attacker and the IoT
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Table 3. Taxonomy of attacks based on different layers of the TCP/IP reference model
Layer Attacks Attackers’ Strategies
Jamming [93, 111, 112] With radio interferencePhysical Tampering [15, 92] Making fake nodes
Collision [21, 138, 141] Transmit data at the same timein the same frequency channel
Exhaustion [68, 72, 161] Multiple collisions and continuous re-transmissionuntil the node runs out of resourceData Link
Unfairness [29, 171] Repeatedly ask for the channel to limit others’ request
Spoofed, or
Replayed routing
information [27, 72, 98]
Routing loops, changing the source of the
route, Repelling network from selected nodes
Selective forwarding [30, 78, 81] Send selected informationto the legitimate receiver
SinkHole [42, 55, 87] Become the target of all nodes in order togather all information
Sybil [24, 121, 187] Create lots of pseudonymous identitiesto undermine the authorized system
WormHoles [74, 177] Re-transmit information to the IoT nodes
Hello flood [63, 148, 151] Use Hello messages to flood thenetwork with these tiny messages
Network
Acknowledgement spoofing [142] Spoof the link layer acknowledgement
SYN flooding [49, 179, 183] Resend request multiple times tofill the capacity of the transport layerTransport
De-synchronization, [75, 119, 127] Reinitialize the connection in order to disrupt it
Application
Reliability attacks:
Clock skewing,
Selective message
Forwarding,
Data aggregation distortion
[10, 78, 106, 113, 124, 131, 186]
Impersonate itself as a reliable node in
the IoT network and sends corrupted data
network. In these types of attacks, the intruders can use the computing power of CPUs and even GPUs to launch attacks
on the IoT network [12, 100].
Low-end device class attacks: In contrast to the previous class of attacks, in this class, the devices which have low
power and energy are engaged in attacks on IoT devices. The attacker uses the radio connection between itself and
the IoT device to perform the attack. As an example, smart watches or smart home gadgets are very common in every
home. These tiny devices connect to your smart home network which includes TV, refrigerator, cooling system, home
security and they can control the configurations of these features. However, these smart home utilities could also be
attacked by these little IoT devices [13, 96].
2.2.7 Attacks based on transmitting information. The purpose of most IoT networks is to sense and collect information
from the surrounding environment. For this reason, thousands of sensors are being used to gather information. These
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Fig. 4. Different attacks on an IoT Network. The highlighted path shows the domain of interest in this paper where PUFs can
contribute the most to IoT security.
sensors are also vulnerable to various types of attacks which can be used to launch network attacks which can be
categorized into six groups:
Man-in-the-middle attacks: In these attacks, the attacker is between the legitimate transmitter and the receiver. The
attacker relays information between these two entities but may retain valuable information. Figure 5 demonstrates this
attack between two parties Alice and Bob. In this example, Alice wants to communicate with Bob, Alice sends a packet
to Bob. However, Eve receives the packet and stores the important information and then forwards the packet to Bob.
Here Alice and Bob are not aware of the existence of Eve on the network. They think that they have a direct connection
to each other [6, 16].
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Fig. 5. An example of the man-in-the-middle attack
Message Replay attacks: In this attack, the intruder eavesdrops the channel captures the message and then re-
transmits it to the target. Later, after the session is over, they send modified packets to the IoT network to compromise
the targeted IoT networks [24, 114].
Fabrication attacks: Fabrication attacks include flooding the IoT network by sending wrong authentication messages
to the core of the network. This attack compromises the information being exchanged among the IoT devices [100].
Alteration attacks: In alteration attacks, the intruders try to compromise the communication protocol among the
users in the IoT network. They manipulate and alter the information exchange among the users to disrupt the normal
operation of the protocols [121].
Eavesdropping attacks: In these attacks, the attackers just intercept the communication between the legitimate
transmitter and the receiver to gather valuable information of both users and the network. In this case, the channel and
the network are not secure anymore. Hence, the confidentiality among the users in the IoT network may be breached if
appropriate mechanisms are not used to protect the information exchanged [88].
Interruption attacks: In this attack, the attackers disrupt the availability of the connection among the users in an
IoT network. In this case, the users try to establish the connection and they consume lots of power for the connection.
Energy exhaustion is the direct result of this attack [5].
2.2.8 Host-Based Attacks. In this attack, the intruder targets the host resources such as the Operating System (OS) or
the hardware. The assumption in this attack is that the intruder has managed to access to the host. Host-based attacks
are categorized into three groups: hardware-, software- and user-based attacks. The IoT nodes are usually tiny devices
with some applications or software embedded in the OS. The attackers target these three resources of IoT devices and
compromise each group with different impact on the overall network [48].
Targeting the hardware: In hardware-based attacks, the attackers manipulate the hardware or try to compromise the
driver applications of the targeted hardware. Sometimes they insert malicious code on the micro-controller to attack
the driver. In other cases, the attackers replace the hardware and place the destructive one instead of the legitimate
hardware [20].
Targeting the software: In this attack, the intruders exploit the resources (such as power, battery or even buffer
and queues of the different applications or protocols) of the users in an IoT network. Hence, battery depletion, buffer
overflow, or a full queue (stack) might be the results of this attack [189].
Targeting the user: This attack steals valuable information such as secret keys, passwords, hash tables, or protocol
rules from the user. Storing this information in users’ memory attracts attackers and intruders to the host [18, 65].
2.3 Classification of IoT Security Attacks
In section 2.1, we reviewed security challenges in IoT networks and we presented a security taxonomy. Then, Section
2.2 summarized common attacks based on TCP/IP stack layers. In this section, we classify common attacks based on the
IoT ecosystem. Although there is no well-defined layered model for IoT; Figure 6 illustrates a three-layered model for
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IoT devices [155]. These layers include perception, network, and application. First, we describe each layer and then we
present a classification of attacks with respect to the different layers in Table 4.
2.3.1 Perception layer. The lower layer of the IoT network, the perception layer, is responsible for the interconnection
of the nodes in the network. For instance, Arduino boards can use the Ethernet to get access to the Internet, Raspberry
Pi can use the Ethernet, WiFi module, or the Bluetooth module to connect to the Internet or other nodes. Each of the
communicating devices should have a unique identification called the Universally Unique IDentification (UUID) [91].
Most of the time, these IDs are interchangeable. Hence, they are embedded in the hardware as System-on-Chip (SoC) or
are provided by a secondary chip [156].
2.3.2 Network layer. This layer includes interfaces, communication channels, network management, addressing, and
so on. It is also responsible for all communications and connectivity for all devices in the network using multiple
communication protocols [180]. Unlike the Internet, there is no standard protocol for the network layer for IoT devices.
However, Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) 3.1 [73] and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [149]
are two common protocols for the IoT networks. This layer transmits information within the network (other nodes) or
outside of the network (e.g., the Internet or a sensor network). Since devices in an IoT network have a limited amount
of energy and computation, the role of addressing, forwarding, and routing is pivotal in such networks.
2.3.3 Application layer. This layer makes sure that different entities in the network communicate using the same type
of service. This layer is also called the service-oriented layer [80] and it handles data for different applications based on
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user requirements and demands. For instance, for applications such as smart transportation, smart home, and eHealth,
it can store data into an appropriate database [80].
2.3.4 Classification of attacks in IoT networks. IoT is utilizing various available network backbones such as wireless
sensor networks, the Internet, RFID, and so on. Hence, it is crucial to categorize all attacks based on the layers of IoT
we have identified in this section. Table 4 provides an overview of some of these attacks. Since certain tiny IoT devices
are not able to implement some encryption methods, PUF may come handy to enhance the security of these devices.
Table 4. Taxonomy of attacks with respect to the different layers in the IoT structure
Encryption attack Perception attacks Network attacks Application attacks
Side Channel attack Node tampering Sybil attack Virus and worms
RF interference Route informationattack
Spyware and
adware
Man-in-the- middle attack
Node jamming Sinkhole attack Trojan horse
Malicious node
injection RFID spoofing Denial ofservicePhysical damage RFID cloning
Crypto attacks Social engineering
Man in the middle
attack Malicious
scriptSleep deprivationattack Denial of service
3 HARDWARE-BASED SECURITY
In the previous section, we reviewed software-based security challenges and attacks. However, based on the production
line for Integrated Circuits (ICs), there are several vulnerabilities based on hardware designs. Figure 7 shows this
semiconductor manufacturing process chain which consists of different tasks. As a result of the fast and growing trends
in IC manufacturing and production, this global supply chain can be targeted and attacked at different vulnerable
points. Some common threats faced by the manufacturing process include fake copy, side-channel attack, reverse
engineering, Intellectual Property (IP) hijacking, and hardware Trojans. Next, we review hardware-based attacks and
threats disuccesed in [128, 129].
3.1 Fake Replica
In this attack, the intruder counterfeits the original IP illegally. Fake replica and piracy are totally different. Piracy
means overbuilding the entire IC. This might happen because the attacker gets access to the design information at
different points such as the design or the fabrication. However, a fake replica might happen at different stages such as
recycling, packaging, or the new vendor [86]. Fake replica or counterfeiting can be very harmful to the industry. Since
the attacker uses the reputation of the original designer, instead he/she uses expired or old designs to rebuild the ICs
or IPs. In most cases, the attacker wants to earn more money by selling fake products. However, he/she can also put
malicious circuits such as Trojans into those ICs and compromise different critical products and applications such as
airplanes, vehicles, drones and UAVs, elevators, and so on.
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3.2 Side-Channel Attack
In some cases, physical states’ parameters such as power consumption, timing values, or electromagnetic reflection
from hardware can reveal important information to the intruder. In most cases, such information sets can be extracted
when the application is being executed where the attacker can perform different tests. Such attacks which involve
extracting the behavior of devices [126], are very common in public-crypto systems such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA). RSA uses public and private keys which encrypts and decrypts messages based on modular operations and
large exponential values. Two common approaches include calculating the multiplication chain: the first one uses
the naive multiplication operation and the second one uses square-and-multiply method [44, 103]. In both scenarios,
the attacker can use delay analysis to perform a timing side-channel attack. Delay analysis measures the execution
time for a number of multiplications which the system uses to calculate the exponential results [176]. In addition to
timing side-channel attacks, other attacks such as measuring the photonic emissions, systemic acoustic noise, power
consumption, and electromagnetic emissions are common in crypto systems [58, 125, 140].
3.3 Reverse Engineering (RE)
Reverse engineering is the process wherein the intruder follows a reverse path from the application to the design point
for the IC or the IP to reconstruct it, modify it, or implant malicious circuit into it. RE may involve different steps such
as i) detecting the technology model which is being used in the design and fabrication steps [19], ii) taking out different
parts of design such as gate, logic, circuit, and physical [164], and iii) discovering and observing the functionality of the
IP or the IC [128, 136]. RE might have different objectives such as hijacking the design, illegally replicating the IC and
announcing the technology used in the design. The intruder might use a table of information based on a defined pair of
inputs and outputs to evaluate the behavior of the circuit. In this way, the attacker can verify the gate level design from
the IP/IC. The goal of the attacker might be hijacking at the gate-level, circuit-level, or physical design by performing
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reverse engineering in order to extract an abstract level of the IP. The attacker can use the abstract level to reproduce
the product and to sell it illegally or implant a malicious circuit into the product.
3.4 Intellectual Property (IP) Hijacking
When the IC is designed, the designers of the IP company or people involved in the fabrication process might hijack
the design information without respecting the copy-right terms. Moreover, an attacker at the fabrication stage may
reproduce additional chips to sell them on the black market. In these cases, unreliable people can steal the design
information and claim the ownership of the IP or the IC [130]. For instance, they are three IP piracy methods. In one
case, the attacker can steal the third-party’s IP. In another case, the intruder can steal the layout design. Finally, the
intruder may take the IC design in the fabrication process and try to rebuild many others.
3.5 Trojans in Hardware
Malicious modifications to an IC can be defined as a hardware Trojan. This Trojan can mislead the communication or
cause a failure in control and processing units. In this kind of attack, the intruder can modify and alter the circuit or add
a malicous circuit to it. Since the testing procedures are usually slow and expensive, it is hard to detect the hardware
Trojans after wafer fabrications. Moreover, the technology is merging with Nano- and Pico- meter fabrication design
and because of the large space inside of ICs, there are many locations for implanting Trojans. Such locations include
different design points such as logic, circuit, and physical and the fabrication process [79, 163, 175].
After introducing hardware-based attacks, Figure 8 summarizes these attacks and indicates which entities are
vulnerable to specific attacks in the semiconductor manufacturing chain. Section 4 introduces the concept of PUFs and
their roles to prevent the aforementioned attacks.
4 PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS (PUFS)
Physically Unclonable Functions use the unique variations introduced in the fabrication of the device, to extract a
fingerprint unique to the device. One or more specific parameters of the device such as threshold voltage, critical
dimensions etc., are measured when an external stimulus is applied. When the devices’ parameter is being measured for
the first time, the measurement is called a challenge and is stored in the server. When the same parameter is measured
again when the same external stimulus is applied it is called a response. The challenge and response form a pair, called
the Challenge Response Pair (CRP) and are generally compared with each other to verify the authenticity of the device.
The difference between the challenge and response of a PUFis referred to as the challenge response error.
PUFs can be generally classified into two broad categories: “strong PUFs” and “weak PUFs” based on the number of
possible CRPs. Weak PUFs leverage the manufacturing variability and allow digitization of some “fingerprint” of the
hardware device. The number of responses in a weak PUF is directly proportional to the number of components in
the device used for generation of CRPs [70]. This fact results in a small number of CRPs with stable responses which
are usually robust to environmental conditions. Weak PUFs are generally used for secret key generation because the
responses are more stable and hence easily reproducible. Strong PUFs can support a large number of CRPs. Ideally, if
the number of unique CRPs is high, even though an attacker gets temporary accesses to the system, he/she will not be
able to apply all the responses (brute force attack) and get access to the system. Hence, strong PUFs are generally used
for authentication[70]. However, a large set of PUF responses may offer stronger cryptographic strength as it leads to
longer cryptographic keys [104]. The entropy of a PUF is defined as the total number of independent CRP’s that can be
produced from a PUF and is directly proportional to the number of bits that can be extracted from it. Independent CRP
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Fig. 8. Hardware-based attacks based on different entities in the semiconductor manufacturing process.
refers to the fact that if one CRP is known, one cannot predict the other CRPs in the PUF, hence there is no shared
information between two CRPs.
Usability of PUF can be determined by two statistical parameters of intra-distance and inter-distance which are
defined as follows:
• Intra-distance: the Hamming or the fractional Hamming distance between two different responses to the same
PUF challenge
• Inter-distance: the Hamming or the fractional hamming distance between two responses of two different PUFs
to a given challenge.
For a given PUF, these measurements hold the values of reproducibility and uniqueness, respectively.
During the registration process, the server first sends the client a query which is usually the external stimulus to
which we would like to record the behaviour of the device, thereby extracting a challenge from the device, which
is usually a string of bits that will be stored in the server. These challenges will be stored in a secured memory of
a server to allow authorization of the device when appropriate. During authentication, the server sends the same
query to the PUF and its behavior to the stimulus is sent to the server as “response" which is compared against the
"challenge" stored in the secure memory. PUF-based security mechanisms rely on building unique CRP’s. The two
primary applications of a PUF include low cost authentication and secret key generation. During authentication, the
PUFs are queried by challenges and authentication is granted only if the rate of matching responses is statistically high
enough [31]. The amount of error between the challenge and the response is called Challenge Response Pair (CRP)
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error. Another application of PUFs is to utilize the high randomness introduced during its manufacturing to create a
secure key from the device. Such key generation requires ideal PUFs that are robust, tamper evident, and unpredictable.
Using a secure sketch in a fuzzy extractor which we explain in the following sections, we are able to correct noise from
a physical PUF and use it for key generation schemes. Secure sketches use the concept of error correction coding to
ensure that we recover the original PUF data from the noisy PUF.
4.1 Types of PUFs
Different types of PUFs can be made by making use of different components of the device to extract a fingerprint.
Initially randomness was physically introduced into a device to extract a fingerprint such as optical and coating PUFs.
An optical PUF consists of a transparent material which contains scattering of light particles in an uncontrolled manner.
When a laser beam falls on it, a unique and random pattern is produced [118]. A coating PUF can be built by filling
the space between a network of metal wires on top of an Integrated Circuit (IC) WITH an opaque material which is
randomly doped with dielectric particles. The capacitance between each set of wires will be a random value because of
the random placement of doping, the dielectric’s strength and size. This PUF is generally used on the top layer of the
ICs which is generally used to protect the underlying circuits from attackers’ inspection. When a part of the coating is
removed, the capacitance of the wires is bound to change. These PUFs have been used as RFID tags [166].
Current technologies prefer to utilize the PUFs designed based on intrinsic variations, because they are already
embedded in the device. Silicon PUFs exploit the intrinsic variations in the IC manufacturing process. The first silicon
based PUF was introduced in 2002 by Gassend et al. Leaked current-based PUFs whose work was based on the idea that
different physical variations of the same circuit will result in a different leakage current. Another example of silicon
PUFs are delay-based PUFs, where in even using an identical layout will cause distinct delays due to the manufacturing
variations in its components. Arbiter PUFs and Ring Oscillator PUFs are common examples of delay based PUFs [144].
These PUFs need large groups of device components to make them secure. These PUFs tend to take a large amount of
chip space and are vulnerable to side channel attacks because they give off information due to heat and therefore, they
may not be suitable for IoT nodes.
4.1.1 Memory based PUF’s. Memory-based PUFs use the memory already present in chips/devices and hence can be
implemented in simple devices with few or no extra parts added, to allow authentication in a network. PUFs can be
made from different types of memory including SRAM, Flash, MRAM, memristor, and ReRAM. The memory cells are
usually in an unstable state (power up) and should be allowed to settle to a preferred stable state before programming
the memory cell to a binary value. Therefore, it may take some time for the cells to supply a binary value as in the
case of SRAM, or voltage in ReRAM PUF. These PUFs can be regarded as both strong and weak PUFs. SRAM-based
PUFs are often prone to side channel attacks which track the power generated during authentications using a signal
analyzer [32]. Since SRAM PUFs use CMOS architecture, they can be easily integrated into a system but they give
away side channel information when switching states. This can be detected by checking the laser’s wavelength. As a
result, hackers can have enough information to clone the device [69]. PUFs designed using Re-RAMs are attractive
compared to Flash because they are faster and can operate at or below noise level which makes them resistant to side
channel attacks without direct access to the chip. Re-RAM and Magnetoresistive random-access memory (MRAM)
offer low power options when compared to current Flash technologies becasue they rely on resistance. The operating
power of Re-RAM is around 10pJ/bit compared to 1mJ for Flash and 100pJ for MRAM. Table 5 compares the operation
requirements for Flash, Re-RAM and MRAM.
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Table 5. Operation requirements for current and novel memory technologies[36][4][162]
Operation Flash ReRAM MRAM
Program parameter NOR Vds = 5V; NAND Vgb = 15V Vset = +100mV Current: 500uA
Program power required 1mJ/bit 10pJ/bit 100pJ/bit
Program speed (ns) 5000ns/block 2-20ns 2-20ns
Read parameter Voltage: 10mV Current: 1-20uA Current: 1-20uA
Read power required 10 pJ 1pJ 1pJ
Read speed (ns) 50ns 2-20ns 2-20ns
Table 6. Comparison of different types of PUFs.
Type Name Weak/Strong Ref Comment
Special
fabrication
coating Weak [152, 153, 167] Smaller number of CRP
Optical Strong [90, 133, 153] Difficult to evaluate the uniqeness
Silicon
PUF
Delay
based
Arbiter Strong [52, 110, 158] Vulnerable to attacks
Ring
Oscillator Weak [105, 144, 185] Needs large power and space
Memory
based
Re-RAM Strong [2, 33, 120] Very sensitive to environmental and voltagefluctuations
NOR Weak-Strong [41, 157] averaging reads increases reliability of PUFresponse
Butterfly Weak [89, 134] unstable adjoining will effect PUFresponse
SRAM Weak [45, 60, 61] Vulnerable to side-channel attacks
4.2 Comparison and Applications of Different Types of PUFs
Table 6 demonstrates different PUFs based on their types and their specific features. Since the goal of PUFs is to enhance
the security of entities and nodes in a network, they can utilize the physical and application lto enhance the security.
We can also develop a cross-layer design which considers PUF along with these two layers. However, there is no need
for any additional implementation, it is possible to use the built-in structures and element to enhance the security for
the aforementioned layers (physical and application). Based on the security challenges mentioned in sections 2.2 and
2.3, PUFs are introduced to address several security issues of IoT networks. In most scenarios, PUFs are used to achieve
authentication and authorization.
5 STATIC RANDOM ACCESS MEMORY (SRAM) BASED PUFS
SRAM cells consists of cross- coupled inverters connected by access transistors and because of intrinsic manufacturing
variations, SRAM cells will typically settle into a “0" or “1" state consistently [22, 173]. SRAM PUFs were introduced in
[71] where the initial values of the cells, on powering on the SRAM were used to generate a unique fingerprint. The
mismatch between the transistors in a SRAM cell determines the value (“0" or “1") to be assigned to it. The output of an
SRAM PUF is a combination of a various SRAM cells in the memory. The implementation of memory-based PUF is easy
and inexpensive becasue every micro-controller includes a memory which can be used to generate cryptographic keys.
SRAMs tend to emit energy when they switch states which can be detected by checking the wavelength of the laser
by using a signal analyzer. This side channel information leaked will give the attacker enough information about the
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device in order to clone it [32]. These PUFs are most common memory-based PUFs but, they are considered as weak
PUFs due their size limitations.
6 RESISTIVE RANDOM ACCESS MEMORY (RE-RAM) TERNARY PUF
Emerging systems use advanced state-of-the-art technology for its memory, which include Re-RAM, memristive
devices and Magnetic Random Access Memory (MRAM). Memristor and Re-RAM rely on resistive technology to store
information. The manufacturing of Re-RAM is very similar to CMOS technology and hence it can be easily integrated
into the IC. Voltage is used to program Re-RAM and erase cells while current is used to read the resistance values of
the cells [120]. These devices have high randomness which occurs not only in separate dies but also in the same die.
Only specific parameters such as low and high state resistance which are used to represent “0"s and “1"s in making the
challenge and response pairsin the device can be measured consistently.
In a conductive Re-RAM, two dissimilar metals with different conductance values are used. When voltage is applied,
the filament inside Re-RAM forms a bridge and a hole is left in its place when the voltage is reversed. A metal-oxide
Re-RAM works in a similar way but it uses two metal plates separated by an oxide. The oxygen vacancies formed while
programming the device will create a high resistance state and the erased cell will have a low resistance because the
oxides will be evenly distributed.
Re-RAM PUFs will play a vital role in hardware security in the future due to their high randomness which occurs
during the manufacturing process. This high randomness requires for good error correction codes. This device is
sensitive to temperature and noise but offers the benefit of being at or below noise level which makes them more
secure. The memory cells are affected by aging, operating temperature and operating voltage. Some cells may tend to
die faster which can cause a change in the PUF output that may hinder the implementation of the system because it
causes problems in the reliability of bits.
Re-RAM based PUFs use the value of Vset after programming or the resistance of each cell, to differentiate between
"0" and "1" states. The cells close to the threshold can flip one way or the other during response generation when they
are subjected to voltage changes, temperature, aging or electromagnetic interference. This could result in 5-20% CRP
matching error rate if the number of marginal cells is high. [32] offers a solution to this behavior by identifying three
types of cells “0",“1" and “X ". The cells that are too close to the threshold and are not reliable are blanked by an “X".
Figure 9 shows the number of cells whose resistance value are close to the threshold, and therefore can be blanked by
an “X".
A solution to store the three elementary states described was provided in [32]. The memories were segmented
by pairs of rows or columns and the first column of each pair was named active column and the other companion
column. The physical parameter was measured on the active area and the cells that are below the first threshold were
characterized as “0"s, cells above second threshold were “1"s and the cells in between were labeled “X"(ternary state).
When the active cell of a row is characterized as a solid “0", “0" is programmed in this cell and a “1" is programmed in
its companion cell. Similarly, when a cell is characterized as a solid “1", “1" and “0" are programmed in the active cell
and companion cell, respectively. Cells without solid bits were programmed with identical bits in active and companion
cells, “0,0" and “1,1" [32].
Around 68% of the ReRAM cells were blanked, “X" as their Vset was close to the threshold and the rest was used for
CRP generation to generate a 128 bit PUF in a memory array of 1000 bit range, where 50% of the cells were used as
companion cells. The results =showed a CRP error rate of 8 per million. This was expected to improve reliability with
low False Negative Authentications and low False Positive Authentications.
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Fig. 9. Distribution of cells of ReRAM PUF.
The ternary representation of a PUF can be used with other memory/ delay based PUFs to improve their reliability.
6.1 Challenges with PUF Technologies
Analog physical parameters of the fabricated circuit are used to derive the fingerprint of the hardware. These parameters
are prone to noise and may change due to temperature, supply voltage and other parameters. The digital fingerprint of
the PUF may vary due to changes in any of the parameters mentioned before. Differential design techniques are applied
in order to mitigate some of the environmental dependencies in a PUF to make it more stable [70].
Although differential design techniques may improve reliability, the change in environmental conditions will intro-
duce noise in the PUF output. Noise may cause one or more PUF output bits to be flipped resulting in a false negative.
Different error correction coding techniques are being employed in order to improve the reliability of the PUF using
“Fuzzy Extractor" schemes elaborated in section 7. Various error correcting codes have been utilized to reduce the
intra PUF variation factor and improve the similarity of PUF responses for the same query [70]. Adding redundant
information (parity bit or helper data) will increase the probability of error detection and correction during the challenge
response authentication. Linear block codes and 2-D Hamming codes were used earlier in several PUFs.
Taking into account the number of challenges that hinder the perfect reproducibility of the PUF response, we need
mechanisms which will reduce the Intra hamming distance of the PUF responses.
7 FUZZY EXTRACTORS
A Fuzzy Extractor (FE) extracts a uniformly random string R and non-secret string P (helper data) from its initial input
w . This mechanism allows the string R to be used as a key and reproduced exactly with the help of P , even though
the input changes to somew ′ but remains close tow . Fuzzy extractors are said to be information-theoretically secure,
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i.e., a crypto-system whose security is derived only from information theory, where a hacker does not have enough
information to break the encryption, thereby allowing them to be used in cryptography.
Fig. 10. Secure Sketch
FEs are constructed using Secure Sketch (SS), which is a pair of randomized procedures “sketch” and “recover” that
allow precise reconstruction of the initial input from noisy input by making use of some helper data P .
In the “sketch" phase, Helper Data P is extracted from initial inputw , which can be made publicly available. This
output P will be used in the “recover" phase along with noisy inputw ′ to recoverw . This method is secure because the
publicly available Helper Data reveals little to no information aboutw . Figure 10 describes a secure sketch.
Fig. 11. Fuzzy Extractor
FE is defined by a pair of randomized procedures “generate” and “reproduce”. In the “generate" phase, the fuzzy
extractor uses the “sketch” phase of the SS where Helper data, P and Key, R are extracted from the given inputw . The
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“reproduce" phase uses the “recover” phase of the secure sketch which makes use of the Helper data to recover the
original input w from a noisy input w ′ along with the random extractor used in the “sketch" phase, to extract the
randomness from the recoveredw . The ability to recoverw fromw ′ is highly dependent on the technique, usually an
error correction scheme, used in the “sketch” phase of the FE. If the distance between the noisy inputw ′ and inputw is
too large, it may not be possible to recoverw fromw ′. Figure 12 shows the construction of a FE using a secure sketch.
Due to the error tolerance capability of Secure Sketches, their construction is based on error correcting codes. The error
Fig. 12. Construction of a fuzzy extractor using secure sketch extractor
correcting code C is used to correct errors inw ′ by shifting the codeword, althoughw ′ may not be in C . Two different
constructions are used for secure sketch are presented [46]:
• Code-Offset Construction: For inputw , a uniformly random codeword c is selected from C , and SS(w) to be the
shift needed to get from c to w : SS(w) = w − c . To compute Rec(w ′, s), the shift s is subtacted from w ′ to get
c ′ = w ′ − s : c ′ is decoded to retrieve c andw is computed by shifting back to getw = c + s . When codeC is linear,
the information in s is essentially the syndrome of w.
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• Syndrome Construction: The sketch SS(w) computes s = syn(w), where syn is the syndrome. To recover the key,
a unique vector e is chosen such that syn(e) = syn(w ′) − s and outputw = w ′ − e .
Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes which are a part of cyclic error correcting codes, have been implemented
in fuzzy extractors, where 192 syndrome bits out of 255 bits were exposed as helper data offered a stability of 88%
to a PUF correcting 30 errors in a noisy PUF [159]. High performance error correction coding schemes such as
Convolution Coding and Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) are applicable to PUF error correction but are highly
complex to implement. It is practical to use good error correction codes which consider maximum likelihood estimation,
implementation complexity and secret key leakage to improve the performance of the PUF.
8 GENERATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS FROM PUFS USING FUZZY EXTRACTORS
Secret key generation using PUFs will allow users to produce a key from their own devices which need not be stored
in the devices’ memory. Using PUFs to produce keys, will make the device unclonable and hence less susceptible to
hacking. Additionally, the use of PUFs eliminates the security issues related to key storage and distribution. Different
PUFs have been used in the past to generate reliable and reproducible cryptographic keys using FE.
Different schemes have been proposed in the literature for generating reproducible keys using PUFs [77, 90, 95, 154, 158,
191]. The key generation scheme proposed in [77] uses BCH codes and random number generators for the construction
of fuzzy extractors. The main goal of BCH codes is to help reconstruct the PUF estimate from noisy PUF data in order
to be used in the “secure sketch" phase of the FE.
This scheme is one of the primitive schemes and does not require any complex decoders. Hence the error correction
capability is not good. This scheme may be suitable for authentication where a certain error margin can be tolerated. In
key generation schemes, where the key is used for encrypting or decrypting the data, the error in reproducing the key
has to be zero.
Many papers in the literature have proposed different FE architectures. Table 7 presents a comparison of the results
obtained by these different architectures.
Table 7. Comparison Of different fuzzy extractor schemes proposed in the literature.
Fuzzy extractor construction Key length Helper data bits Failure probability Flipping probability
Reed Muller Generalized Multiple Con-
catenated coding [101] 128 13952 10
−6 15%
BCH Repetition Code [102] 128 2052 10−9 13%
Generalized Concatenated (GC) Reed
Muller[122] 2048 2048 5.37.10
−10 14%
GC Reed Solomon[122] 1024 1024 3.47.10−10 14%
Polar Codes with SC [38] 128 896 10−6 15%
Polar Codes with Hash-Aided SCL de-
coder [38] 128 896 10
−9 15%
Serially concatenated BCH-Polar Codes
with SC decoder [85] 250 262 10
−8 15%
Serially concatenated BCH-Polar Codes
with Belief Propagation decoder [85] 250 262 10
−10 15%
In a recent research work proposed in [38], a FE structure based on Polar codes for SRAM PUFs was proposed. This
work utilized complex Hash-Aided SC decoder to ensure that the key was reproducible. The results showed that the
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key was reproducible with a failure probability of 10−9 and utilized 896 helper bits for a key of 128 bits. In [84], we
used a custom-built Arduino shield to read the fingerprint of SRAM PUF devices. We later compared the efficiency of
different fuzzy extractor schemes to generate reliable and reproducible keys while estimating the FAR and FRR. The FE
techniques proposed in the literature utilize long Helper data bits and complex decoder structures to extract the low
failure probability rates. There is a high probability in increasing the FAR and FRR of the PUF based Keys when using
high complex- sophisticated decoders as these were designed to extract the message from very noisy channels, which
may not be the best solution to PUF based keys. Further research to understand the average error rate of each PUF and
using mechanisms appropriate for the PUF will help mitigate such situations.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DISCUSSION
This survey paper reviews different security challenges in IoT networks and devices. Different domains such as data,
communication, architecture, and application are considered for the security taxonomy in IoTs. Software attacks are
discussed based on these aforementioned domains. Then, we reviewed the semiconductor manufacturing process chain
which consists of different tasks to accomplish the hardware design for ICs. This chain brings various vulnerabilities in
different points which can be considered as hardware attacks. PUFs are considered as one of the potential solutions
to counter the hardware based attacks. Noting the challenges of using PUFs due to the variations between different
responses. We surveyed various methods to extract keys from noisy PUF responses using fuzzy extractors schemes.
The importance and need for using the fuzzy extractors schemes for generating cryptographic keys from PUFs is
discussed. A brief discussion on the probability of FE schemes to over correct the Noisy PUF responses and leading to
false authentication rate or false rejection rate is discussed.
The future directions of using PUFs need to focus not only on extracting reproducible schemes from Noisy PUFs
but also to understand the behaviour of each PUF for different environmental and physical conditions. This challenge
required designing schemes that will tailor themselves to the expected error in each device, thereby not allowing under
correction or over correction of the PUF responses; thereby reducing the false rejection rate and false authentication
rate of the PUF.
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